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RECENT DECISIONS
Bills and Notes---Power of Donor-Drawer of Check to Stop Payment.
-Plaintiff, a Minnesota corporation, conducts a school for the educa-
tion and training of subnormal persons. Defendant mailed a check pay-
able to plaintiff's order as a gift, but stopped payment on the check be-
fore it was presented to the drawee bank. Defendant appealed from a
judgment on the pleadings. Held: Reversed. There was no valid gift in-
ter vivos since there was no absolute disposition of the subject matter of
the intended transfer. Laura Baker School v. Pflaum, 30 N.W. (2d)
290, (Minn., 1947).
The decision rests on well-settled principles of personal property
law. Since a check is not money but an order to pay money, there was
no disposition of the intended subject of the gift. The donor exercised
her power of revocation before the check was presented to the bank
for payment; and since a check does not operate as an assignment of
the funds in the bank, its mere delivery does not place the gift beyond
the donor's power of revocation.'
The reasoning of the case, together with the resulting decision, has
ample support in the decided cases-as a matter of fact, it has been
cited as the general rule.2 It is not the purpose of this note to criticize
either the decision or its rationale. However, it might be worth while
to suggest that another approach, more consistent with the framework
of negotiable instruments, would have accomplished the same result.
Most of the analagous cases in the books are concerned with the revo-
cation of a gift of a check resulting from death of the drawer and are
supported by the reasoning pursued in the Pflaum case. The New Jer-
sey Court, in an oft-cited case, said:
"It is well settled that a gift cannot be affected by the delivery
of a check upon an ordinary bank account of deposit where
the drawer's account is good for the amount. The reason is
that until the check is cashed the drawer may stop payment....
The fundamental principle of the law of gifts is that the gift,
to be effective must place the thing donated beyond the control
of the donor."3
It is submitted that the "reason" offered in the quotation is nothing
more than a restatement of the conclusion it is offered to support. Simi-
larly, in Straut v. Hollinger4 it was held that gifts by checks are not
completed until the checks are presented to the drawee bank and paid
during the drawer's lifetime, since, until the checks are paid, the
drawer may stop payment; and in Smythe v. Sanders5 the court decided
1Laura Baker School v. Pflaum, 30 N.W. (2d) 290 (Minn., 1947).2 Pikeville National Bank and Trust Co. v. Shirley, 281 Ky. 150, 135 S.W. (2d)
426, 126 A.L.R. 919 (1939).
3 Provident Institute for Savings v. Sisters of the Poor of St. Francis, 87 N.J.
Eq. 424, 100 AtI. 894 (1917).
4 Straut v. Hollinger, 139 N.J. Eq. 206, 50 Atl. (2d) 478 (1947).
5 Smythe v. Sanders, 136 Miss. 382, 101 So. 435 (1924).
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that there is no delivery in case of a gift of a bank check, unless and
until it is cashed during the lifetime of the donor, as the attempted gift
is one of money. There are ample decisions on this point, of which the
foregoing are but examples. The decision of the Minnesota Court in
the Pflaum case obviously is not without authority, but is does appear
that most of the supporting cases deal with situations where the revoca-
tion was brought about by death rather than by the drawer's stopping
payment before the check was presented for payment.
It may not be amiss to suggest a different road to the same end
which might be slightly more consistent with the law of negotiable in-
struments as it has developed. If a drawer is liable on his check at all,
he is liable by virtue of his promise to pay in the event the drawee
bank does not.6 A promise donated is a promise without consideration,
to describe it in more legally conventional language, and is not usually
enforceable. Therefore it appears that the legal but unexpressed de-
fense in the Pflauwn case was absence of consideration, nothing appear-
ing in the opinion to disclose legal consideration for the defendant's
negotiable promise. Nor is this rationale without expression in the
cases. In Guild v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co. the court dealt with
the question, in part, as follows:
"If the check is a gift, the drawer's engagement that the bank
will pay is without consideration. . .", and (quoting White-
house v. Whitehouse5 ), ". . .a man may not donate what is
merely his own naked promise."
The Supreme Court of Iowa, after pointing out that the great weight
of authority holds that a voluntary promise of a donor to pay money
constitutes a gift which is not complete, continued in these words:
"The giving of a check without consideration is not the im-
mediate voluntary transfer of money, but simply a promise to
pay the money, and being a promise without consideration it
cannot be enforced."9
Moreover, the question takes on further significance when the
rights of a holder in due course (against whom the defense of "no con-
sideration" is not available10 ) are considered. The court in the Guild
6 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Art. V, Sec. 61: "The drawer by
drawing the instrument admits the existence of the payee and his then
capacity to indorse; and engages that on due presentment the instrument will
be accepted or paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dis-
honored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will
pay the amount thereof to the holder . . ."
7 Guild v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 122 Me. 514, 121 At. 13 (1923).
8 Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 90 Me. 477, 38 Atl. 374 (1897).
9 In re Knapp's Estate, 197 Iowa 166, 197 N.W. 22 (1924).
10 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Art. IV, Sec. 57: "A holder in due
course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties,
and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may
enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all
parties liable thereon." See also N.I.L., Art. II, Sec. 28.
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case went on to say that while such a check is not good as to the original
payee, it is good in the hands of an innocent indorsee for value. The
rationale of the Pflaum case might not be extended without conceptual
difficulty to a situation where such a check has been transferred to a
good faith purchaser for value. If the payee of the check gets nothing,
then his transferee takes nothing (applying the law of gifts), and the
rights of the holder in due course, embedded in the law-merchant and
preserved in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, might be for-
gotten and made a part of the "law-historic". After all, the donated
promise is in negotiable form, and properly should be handled within
the conceptual framework provided in Sections 28 and 57 of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law.
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